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Empirical research has unambiguously shown that married men receive higher wages than 
unmarried, whereas a wage premium for cohabiters is not as evident yet. Our paper exploits 
the observed difference between the marital and the cohabiting wage premium in Germany 
and thus provides new insights into their respective sources, typically explained by 
specialization (husbands being more productive because their wives take over household 
chores) or selection (high earnings potentials being more attractive on the marriage 
market). We analyze the cohabiting and the marital wage premium in Germany using a 
shifting panel design for marriages and move-ins from 1993 to 2004 in the German Socio-
Economic Panel. With non-parametric matching models we match men who get married 
(treatment group I) with cohabiting or single men (control groups) and men who move in 
with a partner (treatment group II) with singles. Matching reveals that higher wages are 
mostly due to positive selection – into marriage as well as into cohabitation. Supplementary 
analysis of intra-household time use suggests that specialization, if any, is part of the 
selection process from single to cohabitation to marriage.  
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 1 Introduction 
Married men receive higher wages than unmarried. Whereas this marital wage premium 
(MWP) has been shown in basically every country study, the existence of a cohabiting 
wage premium (CWP) is not so evident, yet. According to the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) e.g., a man who got married in the preceding year receives a 13 percent higher 
wage rate than a man who stayed single (Barg / Beblo 2007). Based on the same data set, 
moving in with a partner leads to a comparatively smaller premium of 6.7 percent in the 
subsequent year.
1 In this paper we exploit the observed difference between the cohabiting 
and the marital wage premium to draw conclusions about their respective sources 
(specialization versus selection). A second and related question concerns the relative 
importance of the legal framework for marriage and cohabitation on couples’ time use 
arrangements. 
Regarding the sources of the MWP, we can distinguish two main hypotheses in the 
literature: the specialization or productivity hypothesis and the selection hypothesis.
2 The 
specialization hypothesis postulates that married men tend to have more time and energy to 
invest in their job than unmarried men because their wives can “back them up” on all 
remaining chores. Traditional division of household responsibilities between husbands and 
wives makes married women take over the main part of household production, including 
child rearing, and gives their spouses the chance to be more productive in the labor market 
(Becker 1985). This reasoning includes a potentially higher sense of responsibility of 
married men to take care for their families financially. Empirical evidence for the 
specialization hypothesis is provided among others by Kenny (1983) who concludes that 
married men accumulate human capital more
 rapidly, as well as Korenman and Neumark 
 
1 Both averages are based on data from the interview years 1994 to 2005 and refer to dependently employed 
men (only private sector for the married). 
2 Alternative explanations for the MWP, yet more difficult to distinguish empirically from the mentioned two, 
include employer favoritism for married employees (Hill 1979) and compensating wage differentials where 
married men have higher wages because they take jobs with fewer amenities and non-pecuniary rewards 
(Reed / Harford 1989). 
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(1991), whose results based on a US company personnel file show a faster wage growth 
after marriage. By integrating the wife’s labour market hours in the analysis, Chun and 
Lee’s study (2001) reveals marriage wage gains to be explained by the degree of 
specialization within the household. Antonovics and Town (2004) uncover a MWP even for 
monozygotic twins. Kermit (1992) presents evidence that marriage makes men more 
productive as the input of the spouse's time enhances productivity augmentation. A study 
by Mamun (2005) provides empirical support for intra-household spillover effects of the 
partner’s education. 
The second explanation for the MWP proceeds on the assumption that men with higher 
(potential) wages are more likely to get married than men with lower income prospects. 
This selection can work either directly through women preferring men with higher wages or 
indirectly through characteristics that are valuable for both, the marriage market and the 
labor market (Becker, 1981). Empirical evidence for selection to explain at least part of the 
wage premium can be found in Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997), Breusch and Gray (2004), 
Datta Gupta, Smith and Stratton (2005), Ginther and Zavodny (2001). According to 
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997), US men with higher earnings are more likely to marry and 
less likely to divorce. Using Australian data Breusch and Gray (2004) find similar wage 
levels for married and cohabiting men but higher earnings for ex-married in comparison to 
never-married men. According to Datta Gupta, Smith and Stratton (2005) the marital 
premium diminishes after controlling for individual fixed effects – another support for the 
selection hypothesis. However, by focussing on shotgun weddings, which they assume to 
be uncorrelated with earnings ability Ginther and Zavodny (2001) find little evidence for 
selection. 
In view of these rather heterogeneous research results on its sources, the MWP seems to 
have remained a puzzle in the economic literature. Our paper provides further pieces to 
solve this puzzle. We start with the question, whether the selection and specialization 
hypotheses apply to cohabiting couples in the same way as they work for married. On one 
hand, it could be argued, that both selection and specialization should be prevalent at the   4 
g 
methodology. 
                                                
time of moving in with somebody regardless of the legal status of the relationship. On the 
other hand, differences in the legal status of cohabitation and marriage still exist in most 
countries. Institutional settings such as joint income taxation for married couples, the 
entitlement for maintenance payments after split up, inheritance regulations and widows’ or 
widowers’ pensions may create differing incentives for married and cohabiting couples to 
engage in household specialization. As Ginther, Sundström and Björklund (2006) point out 
for Sweden, cohabiting couples may face a lower commitment level which translates into a 
shorter expected duration of the relationship. In addition, incentives to marry for different 
groups are also affected by the legal framework, so that, as a result, married and cohabiting 
couples might differ systematically. Accordingly, most comparative empirical evidence 
confirms a larger WP for marriage than for cohabitation. (see e.g. Stratton 2002, Cohen 
2002, Datta Gupta / Smith / Stratton 2005 as well as Ginther / Sundström / Björklund 
2006). 
While there is a wide range of research on wage premia for the United States, Australia, 
and several European countries,
3 the relationship of the MWP and the CWP in Germany 
has not been investigated yet. By use of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we 
would like to fill the gap and compare the premia for marriage and cohabitation with a non-
parametric estimation approach, the so-called matching methodology:
4 That is, to single 
out selection effects we would ideally like to compare the wage rate of a married or 
cohabiting man with the wage rate of this same man if he had not formed a partnership 
(counterfactual situation). As this procedure is obviously not applicable, we have to 
approximate this counterfactual situation by looking at the wage of a single, but otherwise 
similar man. Similarity is achieved by conditioning on characteristics that are assumed to 
have an effect on the family status, also referred to as the treatment status in the matchin
 
3 Apart from those already cited see e.g. the study by Schoeni (1995) and, for the MWP in Germany, Barg and 
Beblo (2007). 
4 Another application of a matching approach within the context of marriage and wages is provided in a 
working paper by Maasoumi, Millimet and Sarkar (2005) who investigate the distribution of the MWP in the 
US.   5 
Using a shifting 3-year panel window on marriages in the GSOEP between 1993 and 2004, 
men who marry in the reference year (t) and are still married in t+1 are matched with single 
men who stay unmarried all through from year (t-1) to year (t+1). By holding constant 
characteristics that might have an impact on both, a man’s hourly wage rate as well as his 
likelihood to get married, we take account of the possible selection of men with high wages 
into marriage. In this first matching model we hope to detect how much of the MWP can be 
attributed to the selection hypothesis. 
To have a comparative measure of the MWP between married and cohabiting men, we set 
up a second sampling and matching procedure accordingly. Assuming that potential 
selection into a relationship and household specialization should apply to married as well as 
cohabiting men and in light of the different legal treatment of marriage and cohabitation, 
we expect the wage difference between married men and cohabiters to be of much smaller, 
but still remarkable, size than the wage difference between married and single men. 
In a third matching model we assess the size of the selection effect at the time of moving in 
with a partner (either instead of or prior to getting married legally). Here we use the 
shifting-panel window on move-ins in the GSOEP between 1993 and 2004. Men who 
report to live in the same household as their partner for the first time in the reference year 
(t) and still do so in t+1 are matched with single men who live alone all through from year 
(t-1) to year (t+1). This way, we also take account of the possible selection of men with 
high wage potentials into cohabitation. 
In the next Section we describe potentially wage-related legal differences between married 
and cohabiting couples in Germany. The econometric matching approach is laid out in the 
third section, followed by a description of our data sampling procedure in Section 4. 
Empirical results on the propensity score estimations and the matched wage differentials of 
married versus single men and married versus cohabiting men are presented in Sections 5 
and 6. In the latter we also compare time use decisions of married and cohabiting couples. 
The last Section discusses caveats and possible extensions of our approach.   6 
2 Legal  differences 
As in most countries, cohabitation and marriage have different legal status in Germany. 
Particularly the incentives for married and cohabiting couples to engage in intra-household 
specialization of time use are expected to vary with institutional settings such as joint 
taxation of married couples or the coverage of a non-employed spouse within the wage 
earner’s public health insurance. Joint taxation of married couples combined with a tax 
allowance for each partner creates a greater economic incentive for married to specialize in 
a breadwinner-housewife-type model (or vice versa) than for cohabiting couples. Hence, 
specialization should be more prevalent in married couples and, as a result, we might 
expect the MWP to be larger than the CWP. Coverage of the marital partner in the public 
health insurance provides a similar immediate effect for more specialization within married 
than cohabiting couples. In comparison, the law for widows’ or widowers’ pensions creates 
rather long-term returns, as only married are entitled and thus may be willing to engage in 
intra-household specialization in view of future compensation (see Table 1). Other indirect 
effects leading the MWP to outrage the CWP are created by the regulations for 
maintenance payments after split up, where the splitting cohabiter is only entitled to receive 
maintenance support if he or she sacrifices employment for a raising a common child under 
3 years of age, and lower dissolution costs for cohabiting couples. As a result, cohabiters 
may face a lower commitment level which translates into a shorter expected duration of the 
relationship and, thus, less specialization (as this is a more risky investment for a non-
married partner who specializes in housekeeping).  
The above-mentioned legal differences between married and cohabiting couples in 
Germany are listed in Table 1. The fourth column concludes states whether they are related 
– directly or indirectly – to the size of a potential wage premium. 
   7 
Table 1: Legal differences between marriage and cohabitation affecting the wage 
premium 
  Married couples  Cohabiting couples  Reason for  
MWP > CWP 
Payment  Pay premium in the public sector  Pay premium in the public sector 
only if child present 
no 
Taxation  Joint taxation  Individual taxation  Direct effect 
Health insurance  Not employed spouse is covered 
by (public) health insurance of 
employed spouse 
Individual insurance Direct  effect 
Entitlement for social 
transfers 
Parental leave benefit, 
unemployment benefit means-
tested on partner’s income 
Parental leave benefit, 
unemployment benefit means-
tested on partner’s income 
no 
Paternity  Husband of mother is the legal 
father 
Father has to recognize the child 
and mother has to agree 
no 
Custody regulation  Joint custody  Joint custody if both parents 
agree 
no 
Maintenance support  Obligation to support spouse  Obligation for support only if the 




Entitlement  No entitlement  Indirect effect 
Inheritance regulation  Automatic inheritance 
(mandatory fraction), high tax 
exemptions 
Written testament required (no 
mandatory fraction), inheritance 
tax 
no 
Dissolution costs  Legal fees depending on income 
level 
No legal costs  Indirect effect 
 
3 Matching  approach 
The simplest way to assess the wage effect of being married
5 would be to compare the 
wage rates of married and non-married. This would be a valid approach if married men 
formed a randomly selected subgroup of all men. However, in face of an observed MWP 
and according to the selection and specialization hypotheses, individuals neither sort 
randomly into marriage nor are they equally affected by marriage. Instead, a selection bias 
may emerge if the likelihood of marriage is related to the wage rate. If men with more 
favorable labor market characteristics (i.e. who are more likely to experience wage growth) 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, in this section the terms married and marriage are used for all household formations, 
including move-ins. are also more attractive to women as potential mates, the true wage differential between 
married and non-married will be overestimated. In this way, our research question may be 
interpreted as a classical evaluation problem, where counterfactual outcomes are to be 
estimated in order to assess the true wage premium of marriage.  
To produce a credible estimate of this counterfactual or hypothetical outcome, we apply the 
method of matching which identifies the causal effect of a “treatment” by comparing the 
wage rate of a married man with the wage rate that would have been realized, had that same 
man stayed unmarried (Rubin 1974). This yields the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), an estimate of the average expected effect of marriage on the wage rate for all men 
who are marrying. 
Let Y1i denote the wage rate of a man one year after marriage and let Y0i denote the wage 
rate of a man who stays unmarried. Then, the ATT is given by:  
) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = − = ≡ i i i i D Y E D Y E ATT  
where Di is an indicator variable which equals one if person i is married and equals zero 
otherwise. 
As the hypothetical wage outcome  ) 1 | ( 0 = i i D Y E  (i.e. of a married man not being married) 
cannot be observed, we have to refer to wages of unmarried but otherwise similar men. 
According to the Conditional Mean Independence Assumption (CMIA) (Rosenbaum / 
Rubin 1983), Y0 is the same for treated and untreated individuals in expectation, if we 
control for differences in observable characteristics X: 
) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | ( 0 0 X D Y E X D Y E i i i i = = =  
Hence, if we assume that selection into marriage is taken up by this set of individual 
characteristics, any remaining difference between treated and non-treated individuals can 
be attributed to the effect of marriage. By conditioning on X, we can select the appropriate 
control group of non-treated, i.e. non-married, men by means of propensity score matching 
where every person in the treatment group (married) is matched to a comparable control 
  8   9 
                                                
person from the non-treated group (non-married). The vector X includes all variables 
available that presumably affect the event of marriage while having an influence on the 
wage level as well. 
The first step in selecting comparable individuals, therefore, is to estimate a Probit model 
of getting married and derive the corresponding propensity score (PS). The intuition behind 
the PS matching is that individuals with the same probability of “treatment” can be paired 
for purpose of comparison. In our setting, it describes the likelihood of getting married (or 
moving in with a partner) in the following year for every man in the sample. In the next 
step, married men are matched to unmarried based on their estimated probability of 
belonging to the treatment group, given by the distance metric PS = P(X) (Rosenbaum / 
Rubin 1983). We apply nearest neighbor matching with replacement, where for each 
married man that one non-married man with the closest PS is selected.
6  
 
4 Data  sampling 
The data used for our analysis are based on data from several waves of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a yearly micro-data panel which has been 
conducted in annual interviews of individuals and households since 1984 in West Germany 
and since 1990 in East Germany.
7 It is best suited for our analysis as it contains 
information on wage income and various individual characteristics that are likely to affect 
marriage prospects and labor market outcome at the same time. Non-married participants in 
the survey provide information about their living circumstances, such as whether they live 
alone or with a partner. Moreover, this information is available over a long period of time 
which enables us to gather a decent number of respondents who experience a marriage or 
move-in within the observation period.  
 
 
6 A detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different PS matching algorithms can be found 
in Imbens (2004). 
7 For a detailed description of the data set see SOEP Group (2001). Figure 1: Sampling procedure 
reference year 
2005 t-1     t     t+1    1992 
 
 
We apply a shifting panel design for marriages (or move-ins) between 1993 and 2004 (as 
displayed in Figure 1). A panel window of 3 years ensures that we only consider 
respondents who are observed at most one year before marriage (t-1) and one year 
following the year of marriage (t+1). Men who have a change in their reported family status 
from unmarried to married in two subsequent years within the period 1993 to 2004 are 
labeled as belonging to the treatment group I (“married”) of that specific sample year t. 
Likewise, all men who remain unmarried during the corresponding 3-year window (that is, 
from t-1 to t+1 around the sample year) qualify for the control groups. There is one control 
group of singles who report not to live with a partner in either of the years t-1, t or t+1 and 
another control group of cohabiters who live together with a spouse during that same time 
period. Divorcees and widowers are not considered in either of the groups. Thus, the first 
treatment group consists of men who are married in t for the first time and the control 
groups are formed by men who have never been married in their lives, at least up to t+1.
8  
Our second treatment group (“move-in”) includes all those who report to live with a partner 
in the same household in t and t+1, but did not so in t-1. Naturally, we compare the wages 
of this second treatment group only to the control group of singles. 
In total, by focusing on marriages between 1993 and 2004, we make use of GSOEP data 
from the years 1992 to 2005. The total number of men marrying over the twelve-year 
  10 
                                                 
8 Note, that the group of single men is solely defined by not living with a partner. Some of them might have a 
relationship outside their households, though.   11 
observation period and matching our sampling criteria is 364, the corresponding number of 
men who move in with a partner is 219. 
Table 2: Sampling procedure 
Sampling criteria  Remaining numbers of observations 
 Treatment  groups  Control  groups 
  Marriage in t  Move-in with 
partner in t 
Staying single 
(from t-1 to t+1) 
Cohabiting 
(from t-1 to t+1) 
All men (age 20 to 64) observed 
from t-1 to t+1  746 493  10,661  2,444 
Dependent employees in t+1 (no 
self-employed, apprenticees etc.)  594 356 6,043  1,714 
Among marrying: only private 
sector employees in t+1 (no 
public service) 
474 356 6,043  1,714 
With non-missing values on 
weekly working hours and 
monthly wage income in t+1 
440 320 5,438  1,566 
Dependent employees in t-1  396  244  4,213  1,350 
With non-missing values on 
weekly working hours and 
monthly wage income in t-1 
383 230 4,038  1,286 
With non-missing values on 
explanatory variables  364 219 3,772  1,220 
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. 
 
The applied sampling criteria and the remaining numbers of respondents at each step of the 
sampling procedure are listed in Table 2. Naturally, we consider only men who fall in one 
of the observation (treatment or control) groups. As our analysis relies on reliable 
information on individual market wages, we have to restrict our sample to dependent 
employees and ignore all self-employed, unemployed, students, trainees and individuals in 
special training programs or national services (military and civil) at the time of the wage 
comparison (t+1). Another restriction for the married sub-sample regards private-sector 
employees since paying schemes in the public sector are set up with a build-in marriage 
premium already, which would bias our results substantially.
9 Finally, we consider only 
                                                 
9 Although these family status-related wage components have been abolished now, they still affect the wage 
data within our observation period.   12 
                                                
employees who report a positive number of contractual working hours per week and 
positive monthly gross earnings before (t-1) and after (t+1) the reference year. After 
applying these criteria we are left with observations from 5,526 men, 364 of whom get 
married, 219 move in with a partner, 3,772 live as singles and 1,220 cohabit. 
As hourly wage rates are not observed directly, we construct this variable by dividing 
current monthly gross wage earnings by the contractual number of working hours.
10 We 
use the stipulated total number of contractual weekly hours (multiplied by 4.3). To ensure a 
meaningful comparison of wages from 14 years in total (from 1992 to 2003 for the before-
marriage comparison and from 1994 to 2005 for the after-marriage comparison), we 
convert the nominal numbers into year 2000-prices using the consumer price index and 
taking account of nominal wage growth. 
 
5  Propensity Score Estimation 
Three Probit models are estimated, one for married and single men, one including married 
and cohabiting and the third one for those who move in versus staying single. According to 
the CMIA (that selection into marriage/cohabitation is taken up by this set of individual 
characteristics and any remaining wage difference between treated and non-treated 
individuals can be attributed to the effect of marriage/cohabitation), the models include 
explanatory variables on characteristics one year before marriage (t-1) that are assumed to 
have an influence on both, the propensity to marry as well as the wage level. Due to the 
longitudinal perspective of our analysis, our choice of variables that might serve as 
conditioning characteristics for the matching of married/cohabiting and unmarried men is 
limited. We are restricted to variables gathered every single year over the whole period 
from 1992 to 2003 (time of matching, t-1). Given, that the numbers of men in our treatment 
groups are already very limited, we choose that set of variables for the propensity score 
estimation that allows us to keep the maximum number of observations for the matching 
 
10 As wage income variable we use the generated variable labgro$$ provided in the GSOEP.   13 
procedures while leaving a large enough scope for the CMIA to hold. Most importantly, 
and as part of the socio-economic variables, we use the before-marriage wage rate in t-1. It 
is meant to cover unobserved factors that may drive a man’s earnings potential and, 
potentially, his attractiveness as a spouse at the same time. To summarize, we distinguish 
two sets of variables:
11 
•  Socio-economic characteristics such as age, education, occupational status, tenure, type 
of job contract, region, nationality, migration status, children and the wage level at t-1. 
•  Satisfaction and concern variables such as satisfaction with several aspects of life 
(health, income, housing situation, leisure etc.) as well as life in general and concerns about 
the own and the general economic situation.  
The means and standard deviations of all variables included in the PS estimations are given 
separately for the treated men (married and move-ins) and the control groups (single and 
cohabiting) in Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix. 
Table 3: Probit estimation results for all matching models 
  Matching I: 






Moving in with partner 
vs. staying single 
Characteristics in t-1  Coeff. est.  Std. error  Coeff. est.  Std. error  Coeff. est.  Std. error 
Wage rate  0.0206  0.0055 0.0088 0.0068 0.0144  0.0063 
Age 20 to 25 (reference 
group: 46 to 64 years)  0.9019  0.3469  1.5156  0.4584  1.1057  0.3602 
Age 26 to 35  1.4341  0.3363  1.6417  0.4448  1.1361  0.3494 
Age 36 to 45  0.8274  0.3415  0.9719  0.4496  0.7535  0.3550 
Schooling: medium level, 
10 ys secondary schooling 
(reference group: no degree, 
9 ys secondary schooling) 
-0.0144 0.0810 -0.0648 0.1014 0.0628 0.0917 
Schooling: high school, 
advanced technical college  0.0873 0.0984 0.0638 0.1187 0.2511  0.1087 
            
                                                 
11 More information, e.g. on the health status, would be appreciated but is not available over the whole 
observation period. The choice of relevant variables is restricted by the common pool of those who are 
available in each year and for which item non-response is not too severe.    14 
Occupational status: no 
degree, low skill 
(reference group: skilled 
blue collar workers) 
0.0247 0.0909 0.2534  0.1193  -0.3584  0.1248 
Occupational status: white 
collar, medium skill  -0.0388 0.0847 -0.0493 0.1044 -0.0109 0.0885 
Occupational status: white 
collar, high skill  0.0575 0.1090 -0.0325 0.1276 -0.1879 0.1288 
Tenure (in years)  -0.0256  0.0071 0.0008 0.0089 -0.0149 0.0083 
Temporary job contract  -0.4568  0.1275 -0.3557 0.1548 0.0039 0.1185 
Satisfaction with health 
status (10 point scale)  -0.0060 0.0206 0.0572  0.0251 -0.0330 0.0223 
Satisfaction with leisure (10 
point scale)  0.0396  0.0184 0.0081 0.0212 -0.0092 0.0203 
Satisfaction with housing 
situation (10 point scale)  -0.0481  0.0166 0.0033 0.0193 -0.0135 0.0193 
Satisfaction with income 
(10 point scale)  -0.0050 0.0207 0.0399 0.0245 -0.0186 0.0234 
Satisfaction with life today 
(10 point scale)  0.1242  0.0329  0.0889  0.0406  0.0882  0.0359 
Satisfaction with life in 5 
years, expected (10 point 
scale) 
-0.0039 0.0265 -0.0298 0.0324 -0.0007 0.0305 
Worried about own 
economic situation (3 point 
scale) 
-0.1542  0.0585 -0.0762 0.0731 -0.1712  0.0664 
Worried about general econ. 
situation (3 point scale)  0.0680 0.0539 0.0910 0.0665 0.1095 0.0602 
Worried about job security 
(3 point scale)  -0.0961 0.0516 -0.0754 0.0640 0.1103 0.0618 
Presence of child in the 
household  0.4550  0.0758  0.2003  0.0923 0.0437 0.1004 
Living in East Germany  0.0057  0.0870  -0.2711  0.1078 0.0863 0.0946 
Immigrated to Germany  0.2127  0.1262  0.5604  0.1828 -0.2936 0.1926 
Foreign  nationality  -0.1024 0.1189 0.0973 0.1560 -0.0094 0.1456 
Constant  -3.0988 0.4255  -3.416  0.5474 -2.9789 0.4452 
Pseudo  R  squared   0.1165  0.0797  0.0625 
χ
2(24)   287.20  136.15  106.03 
No.  of  observations   4,136  1,584  3,991 
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold coefficients indicate a significance 
level of 5%.  
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The estimation results of the Probit models for all three matching procedures are presented 
in Table 3. Most of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs and sizes. Those for 
getting married and moving in with a partner have many similarities: First of all, the hourly 
wage rate (at t-1) is positively related to the likelihoods of getting married or moving in 
versus staying single but rather unrelated to marrying versus cohabiting. This finding might 
be interpreted as first evidence for the selection hypothesis, be it because a man’s 
attractiveness on the marriage respectively spousal market rises with his income level or his 
inclination to marry increases with the financial background. The older a man the less 
likely he is to couple, with the prime age group for marriage being 26 to 35 and for move-
ins being 20 to 35. Whereas higher education is positively related to cohabitation, marriage 
is significantly more likely among low-skilled men. Years of job tenure and having a fixed-
term contract are negatively and the presence of a child in the household is positively 
correlated with the likelihood of getting married in the following year, but not for moving 
together. Whether a man lives in the Western or Eastern part of Germany and whether he 
has immigrated proves statistically significant for marriage only for the alternative of 
cohabiting but not for staying single since cohabiting is more common in East Germany 
than in West Germany. Satisfaction with the housing situation as well as concerns about the 
own economic situation and about job security seem to have a negative impact on changing 
the family status from single to married in the subsequent year. This goes in line with the 
finding for having a temporary job contract. A rather strong and positive relationship, 
confirming recent research results on marriage and happiness by Stutzer and Frey (2006), is 
found between the individual satisfaction level with life and the propensity to get married 
or move in with a partner. Finally, satisfaction with leisure is also positively related to 
subsequent marriage. 
Based on the estimated propensity scores, men of the treatment groups “married” and 
“move-in” are now matched to their nearest neighbors within the control groups. To get an 
idea of the quality of these matching procedures, Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix provide 
test results on the equality of mean characteristics of treated and matched control persons.   16 
6 Matching  Results   
In the first matching procedure (matching I), an adequate control person for each married 
man is selected among the singles. The results are presented in Table 4: 
The average wage rate of a married man is 15.91 € whereas the unmatched wage of a single 
amounts to 14.08 € on average. This yields a significant unmatched wage gap of about 1.83 
€ or 13 percent. After controlling for differences in observed characteristics, the adjusted 
wage rate of singles rises towards the level of the married (15.70 €). The wage differential 
falls to 21 cents and is not statistically significantly different from zero any more.
12 
Interpreting this ATT of 1.34 percent, a randomly chosen man from the sample of married 
would not receive a lower wage if he were not married. This result confirms that high-wage 
men with better paid socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics (particularly higher 
starting wages) are more likely to marry. Hence, when comparing married to single men, 
the MWP seems to be fully attributable to a selection process into marriage.  
Table 4: Wage differentials between married and single men (Matching I) 






















Source: Own calculations based on the Probit estimation results of Table 3 and Stata matching algorithm 
psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold numbers indicate a significance 
level of 5%. 
Matching II, of married and cohabiting men, yields slightly different results (see Table 5). 
Without controlling for differences in observed covariates, married out-earn cohabiters by 
                                                 
12 Since standard errors provided by the Stata procedure psmatch2 do not take into account that the propensity 
score has been estimated, we use bootstrapping (with 200 replications) for a comparison. The resulting 
standard error of the ATT is 0.58 which confirms the ATT not to be significantly different from zero.   17 
only 68 cents on average. Moreover, this unmatched MWP is not statistically different from 
zero at standard levels. 
Table 5: Wage differentials between married and cohabiting men (Matching II) 






















Source: Own calculations based on the Probit estimation results of Table 3 and Stata matching algorithm 
psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold numbers indicate a significance 
level of 5%. 
After balancing the samples with respect to observable characteristics the differential 
decreases even further to 23 cents, that is, an ATT of 1.47 percent which is also not 
statistically significant.
13 The matched wage rate of cohabiters rises to 15.68 € indicating 
that,  if 
anything, within the sample of married and cohabiting men those with a higher paying mix 
of socio-economic and/or attitudinal characteristics tend to get married. A randomly chosen 
man from the sample of married would not have received a different wage if he had not 
married and remained cohabiting. 
In Matching III we now compare wages of men who have recently moved in with their 
partner with those of men who stayed living alone (see Table 6). The results are similar to 
the findings of Matching I: Move-ins have an average wage rate of 15.01 € and the group 
of unmatched singles receives 14.08 €. Although this observed CWP is smaller than the 
raw MWP, it still amounts to significant 0.94 € or 6.7 percent. After controlling for 
differences in observed characteristics, the wage differential is only 36 cents and not 
                                                 
13 Bootstrapping with 200 replications yields an even larger standard error of 0.67 (compared to 0.61 
produced by psmatch2).    18 
statistically significant anymore.
14 Interpreting this ATT of hardly 5 percent, a randomly 
chosen man from the sample of cohabiters would not receive a lower wage if he had not 
moved in with his partner. This result confirms that high-wage men with better paid socio-
economic and attitudinal characteristics (particularly higher starting wages) are not only 
more likely to marry but also to cohabit without being legally married. Hence, also the 
CWP seems to be fully attributable to a selection process into cohabitation.  
Table 6: Wage differentials between cohabiting and single men (Matching III) 























Source: Own calculations based on the Probit estimation results of Table 3 and Stata matching algorithm 
psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. Bold numbers indicate a significance 
level of 5%. 
We may conclude that our econometric results are in strong favor of the selection instead of 
the specialization hypothesis.
15 On one hand, and as regards the comparison of married and 
cohabiting couples in particular, one might have expected specialization effects to be of 
minor importance today. On the other hand, and as we described earlier, institutions in 
Germany such as joint taxation of married couples, public health insurance coverage and 
pension regulations provide incentives for intra-household specialization for married 
couples only. In fact, if we take a closer look at the post-matching time use decisions at t+1 
within the couples of our matching sample II, the percentage of men whose spouses are not 
gainfully employed is significantly higher among the married than among the cohabiting 
men – 33 compared to 13 percent (see Table 7). Likewise, the intra-household difference in 
                                                 
14 Bootstrapping with 200 replications confirms this finding with a standard error of 0.62. 
15 Sensitivity analyses, where the hourly wage rate is computed using information on actual instead of 
contractual working hours, confirm these results. The same do analyses with alternative matching procedures 
such as kernel matching. However, in the latter the wage premium for cohabiters does not fully vanish after 
matching but remains statistically significant at the 10% level.   19 
working hours (in gainful employment) among married couples more than doubles the 
difference within cohabiting couples. Married men spend less time on child care and 
household work than their spouses. The difference is 4.4, respectively 1.9 hours and 
thereby significantly larger than that between cohabiting women and men. At the same 
time, married men more often live with a child in the household than cohabiters. Although 
we do not observe any difference in part-time employment, we interpret these findings as 
evidence for intra-household time use decisions to differ depending on the legal status of 
the relationship.
16 However, as neither the MWP nor the CWP proved to be significant 
once we conditioned on observable characteristics in our matching models, these traces of 
specialization should not be interpreted as a causal factor for a wage premium but, instead, 
as being one part of the selection process from single via cohabitation to marriage. 
Table 7: Traces of specialization within married and cohabiting couples (based on the 
matched groups in Matching II: married vs. cohabiting) 
  Married  Cohabiting  Test on equal means 
Characteristics in t+1  Mean Mean  T-value 
Difference in working hours (male-female)  21.0779  9.7488  -6.10 
Difference in time spent on child care (m-f)  -4.4312  -1.9481  4.31 
Difference in time spent on housework (m-f)  -1.9116  -1.0718  2.98 
Partner not employed (m-f)  0.3277  0.1320  -4.45 
Partner in part-time employment (m-f)  0.1192  0.1200  -0.04 
Presence of a child in the household  0.4943  0.2940  -5.96 
Observations 215-235  167-187   
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. 
 
                                                 
16 Note, that these numbers have to be interpreted with caution due to a missing value problem on the 
spouses’ side. As soon as we investigate their labour market participation status or any other variable related 
to the specialization question, the sample reduces to about 60 percent of the original size.   20 
7 Discussion 
Recently married men in Germany receive on average 13 percent higher wages than single 
and 4.5 percent higher wages than cohabiting men. With PS matching we can show that the 
average treatment effect of marriage for the married is not statistically significant. In other 
words, married men have higher wages because they have a more favorable mix of 
characteristics, even before marriage, and high-income men with a higher wage potential 
are more likely to get married. This result in support of the selection hypothesis is 
particularly convincing in light of the virtually non-existing wage differential between 
married and cohabiting men. There seems to be a selection process into living together with 
somebody regardless of the legal status. By investigating the premium for cohabitation, our 
analysis provides even further support for this conclusion: men who moved in with their 
partner receive 6.7 percent higher wages than singles on average. Matching reveals that 
also this premium can be fully attributed to selection. Although we find intra-household 
specialization to be more prevalent in married than in cohabiting couples, just as suggested 
by the differences in the legal framework, this does not show off in a wage premium, once 
we condition on observed characteristics. We conclude that specialization should not be 
interpreted as a causal factor for a wage premium but as being part of the selection process 
from single via cohabitation to marriage. 
Though we think the application of a non-parametric estimation method within the context 
of marriage and wages the most promising way to go, there are still a few caveats to 
overcome and possible extensions to be mentioned: First, our analysis focuses on men who 
are employed prior to marriage (respectively the reference year) and does not include 
marrying students, unemployed etc. which may give rise to additional selection. As 
marriage has been shown to be positively related to job security, we argue that this possible 
selection bias would add even further to the positive selection effect investigated in the 
paper. Employed men may be more likely to marry and not (yet) employed men to   21 
postpone marriage until their career has started. In this case, our results would even tend to 
underestimate the full selection effect. 
Second, the sorting of men into marriage or cohabitation may be based on observable as 
well as unobservable characteristics. With regard to the effect of observables we hope to 
have covered most of the sorting process by applying non-parametric matching to married 
and non-married men conditional on a wide range of characteristics. However, men might 
be more likely to find a spouse not only because of their human capital and other 
observable endowments but because of other (unobserved) traits that affect both marriage 
and labor market outcome. As we argue above, at least part of this selection on 
unobservables will be taken care of, as long as it is related to earnings before marriage, by 
including the wage at t-1 into the propensity score estimation. A methodological alternative 
to our approach would be the application of a switching regression model, with endogenous 
marital selection that incorporates a covariance structure between unobserved earnings 
capabilities and unobserved traits valued by potential mates (following Chun and Lee 
2001). However this methodology builds on an appropriate exclusion restriction that is not 
easy to find in the existing data.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Mean characteristics of treated and matched vs. unmatched control 
persons (Matching I: married vs. single) 
  Married Singles  Diff. between 
matched groups 
 Matched  Matched  Unmatched  T-value 
Wage rate in t+1  15.9123  15.7015  14.0750  -0.95 
Characteristics in t-1      
Wage rate  14.9060  15.1980  13.5600  -0.03 
Age   29.3983  29.6291  31.7110  0.54 
Schooling: no degree, secondary school  0.3077  0.3324  0.3444  0.93 
Schooling: o-level  0.3269  0.3187  0.3767  0.03 
Schooling: high school, advanced technical college  0.3159  0.3214  0.2444  -0.34 
Occupational status: no degree, low skill  0.1648  0.1868  0.1718  1.05 
Occupational status: skilled blue collar workers  0.2143  0.1951  0.2397  -0.31 
Occupational status: white collar, medium skill  0.2143  0.2390  0.1400  -0.22 
Occupational status: white collar, high skill  0.4066  0.3791  0.4486  -0.38 
Tenure (in years)  4.8585  5.0236  7.0240  0.48 
Temporary job contract  0.0495  0.0522  0.0899  0.11 
Satisfaction with health status (10 point scale)  7.896  7.9093  7.6355  -0.41 
Satisfaction with leisure (10 point scale)  7.426  7.4011  7.2022  0.02 
Satisfaction with housing situation (10 point scale)  6.7033  6.7637  6.9870  0.60 
Satisfaction with income (10 point scale)  6.8077  6.8544  6.6508  -0.05 
Satisfaction with life today (10 point scale)  7.6346  7.6648  7.2542  0.37 
Satisfaction with life in 5 years, expected (10 point scale)  7.8077  7.8324  7.4793  0.36 
Worried about own economic situation (3 point scale)  1.8407  1.91209  1.8391  1.76 
Worried about general econ, situation (3 point scale)  2.1538  2.1676  2.2211  0.38 
Worried about job security (3 point scale)  2.3049  2.3379  2.3627  0.50 
Presence of child in the household  0.2582  0.2610  0.1304  0.29 
Living in East Germany  0.1978  0.1511  0.2198  -1.51 
Immigrated to Germany  0.1044  0.1209  0.0851  0.67 
Foreign nationality  0.1154  0.1346  0.1066  0.66 
Observations 364  323  3,772   
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. 
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Table A2: Mean characteristics of treated and matched vs. unmatched control 
persons (Matching II: married vs. cohabiting) 
  Married Cohabiting  Diff. between 
matched groups 
 Matched  Matched  Unmatched  T-value 
Wage rate in t+1  15.9123  15.6841 15.2260  -0.60 
Characteristics in t-1        
Wage rate  14.9060  14.7964 14.3828  -0.33 
Age   29.3983  29.6346 31.0524  0.79 
Schooling: no degree, secondary school  0.3077  0.3517 0.2631  0.84 
Schooling: o-level  0.3269  0.3379 0.4107  0.58 
Schooling: high school, advanced technical college  0.3159  0.2885 0.3066  -0.90 
Occupational status: no degree, low skill  0.1648  0.2006 0.1172  0.42 
Occupational status: skilled blue collar workers  0.2143  0.2528 0.2393  0.44 
Occupational status: white collar, medium skill  0.2143  0.1786 0.2164  -0.51 
Occupational status: white collar, high skill  0.4066  0.3681 0.4270  -0.25 
Tenure (in years)  4.8585  4.8684 5.4656  0.25 
Temporary job contract  0.0495  0.0467 0.0820  -0.29 
Satisfaction with health status (10 point scale)  7.896  7.8764 7.3991  -0.20 
Satisfaction with leisure (10 point scale)  7.426  7.5110 7.1672  0.18 
Satisfaction with housing situation (10 point scale)  6.7033  6.7747 6.4221  -0.36 
Satisfaction with income (10 point scale)  6.8077  6.7995 6.3320  -0.80 
Satisfaction with life today (10 point scale)  7.6346  7.6813 7.2172  0.08 
Satisfaction with life in 5 years, expected (10 point scale)  7.8077  7.8571 7.5189  -0.31 
Worried about own economic situation (3 point scale)  1.8407  1.8929 1.7959  0.39 
Worried about general econ, situation (3 point scale)  2.1538  2.1676 2.1475  -0.66 
Worried about job security (3 point scale)  2.3049  2.3242 2.2975  -0.81 
Presence of child in the household  0.2582  0.2637 0.2352  0.03 
Living in East Germany  0.1978  0.1813 0.3107  -0.69 
Immigrated to Germany  0.1044  0.0769 0.0402  0.66 
Foreign nationality  0.1154  0.1209 0.0697  1.30 
Observations 364  269 1,220   
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Table A3: Mean characteristics of treated and matched vs. unmatched control 
persons (Matching III: move-in vs. single) 
 Moving  in 
with partner  Singles  Diff. between 
matched groups 
 Matched  Matched  Unmatched  T-value 
Wage rate in t+1  15.01329  14.6567  14.0750  -0.50 
Characteristics in t-1       
Wage rate  14.1043  14.2724  13.5600  0.20 
Age   28.4338  28.5662  31.7110  0.11 
Schooling: no degree, secondary school  0.2648 0.3059 0.3444  0.68 
Schooling: o-level  0.3836 0.3516 0.3767  -0.61 
Schooling: high school, advanced technical college  0.3425 0.3379 0.2444  0.07 
Occupational status: no degree, low skill  0.0731 0.1142 0.1718  1.61 
Occupational status: skilled blue collar workers  0.2968 0.2603 0.2397  -0.85 
Occupational status: white collar, medium skill  0.1553 0.1461 0.1400  0.03 
Occupational status: white collar, high skill  0.4749 0.4795 0.4486  -0.22 
Tenure (in years)  4.852  4.6014  7.0240  -0.61 
Temporary job contract  0.1005  0.1005  0.0899  0.14 
Satisfaction with health status (10 point scale)  7.6484  7.3105  7.6355  -1.24 
Satisfaction with leisure (10 point scale)  7.0959  6.8904  7.2022  -0.68 
Satisfaction with housing situation (10 point scale)  6.8356  6.7352  6.9870  -0.18 
Satisfaction with income (10 point scale)  6.6027  6.5251  6.6508  -0.12 
Satisfaction with life today (10 point scale)  7.4566  7.2922  7.2542  -0.84 
Satisfaction with life in 5 years, expected (10 point scale)  7.7078  7.5434  7.4793  -0.93 
Worried about own economic situation (3 point scale)  1.8950  1.9041  1.8391  0.09 
Worried about general econ, situation (3 point scale)  2.1964  2.1918  2.2211  -0.19 
Worried about job security (3 point scale)  2.4566  2.5160  2.3627  0.38 
Presence of child in the household  0.1370  0.1461  0.1304  0.02 
Living in East Germany  0.2374  0.2146  0.2198  -0.38 
Immigrated to Germany  0.0320  0.0274  0.0851  -0.21 
Foreign nationality  0.0776  0.0776  0.1066  0.12 
Observations 219  165  3,772   
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP waves 1992 to 2005. 
 
 
 